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6.1 Introduction  
 
In October 1989 the BCEAO, which is the central bank for the West African Economic and 
Monetary Union, announced its intention to shift towards using indirect instruments of 
monetary policy, based on modifications of the central bank discount rate as the primary 
policy tool. There has been some question whether the BCEAO has actually begun to actively 
use its discount rate as a monetary policy tool, (see IMF 2001 on this point). This paper asks 
to what extent the BCEAO modifies its discount rate in response to changing domestic 
economic conditions, or, alternatively, whether movements in the BCEAO discount rate are 
driven above all by changes in foreign interest rates. We focus in particular on the period after 
                                                 
1 We gratefully acknowledge helpful comments from Professor David Fielding, Dr Kalvinder 
Shields, one anonymous referee and seminar participants at the UNU-WIDER workshop on 
Long Term Development in the CFA Zone Countries of sub-Saharan Africa, June 2003, 
Helsinki and one anonymous referee. Remaining errors are as always the responsibility of the 
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the January 1994 devaluation of the CFA franc, considering to what extent the BCEAO reacts 
to changes in domestic inflation and output, to external constraints involving reserve levels 
and French interest rates, as well as to other relevant variables. While the BCEAO has been 
criticized in the past for not using its discount rate as an active policy tool, and while it is true 
that discount rate changes have been infrequent since 1994, we find evidence that the BCEAO 
does react to domestic economic variables in a limited fashion, and in particular to inflation. 
Our estimates are consistent with an interpretation that in the long-run, the BCEAO matches 
changes in French interest rates one for one, but in the short-run it retains a significant 
freedom to react to domestic economic variables. We arrive at this conclusion using two 
alternative estimation methods. In the first, we estimate several extended Taylor rules using 
both quarterly and monthly data. With the second method we use a multinomial logit model to 
estimate the probability that changes in variables such as inflation, the output gap, or foreign 
interest rates will lead to a discrete change in the BCEAO discount rate. This second 
estimation method, which we see as complementary to the first, takes account of the fact that 
central banks in practice modify their discount rates in discrete steps (usually of at least 25 
basis points), rather than as a continuous variable.  
 
In the remainder of the chapter we first provide a brief description of the recent evolution of 
monetary policy in UEMOA. In Section 6.3 we then estimate an interest rate reaction function 
for the BCEAO using both quarterly and monthly data. Section 6.4 extends this inquiry by 
using a multinomial logit model to estimate probabilities of discrete changes in the BCEAO 
discount rate. Section 6.5 discusses the robustness of our interest rate results. Finally, Section 
6.6 concludes. 
 
6.2 Monetary Policy in UEMOA: 1993-2000 
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 In the period immediately preceding and following the January 1994 devaluation of the CFA 
franc, monetary policy decisions were determined almost exclusively by the goal of 
maintaining the CFA franc’s peg to the French peg.. Before January 1994 BCEAO interest 
rates were kept high in order to offer holders of CFA assets a risk premium. In the months 
immediately following the devaluation, BCEAO interest rates were raised significantly as part 
of the provisions of country IMF programmes.  
 
Since 1995 BCEAO interest rates have gone through two distinct periods. During the first 
period, from December 1994 to October 1996, the BCEAO undertook a series of stepwise rate 
reductions that resulted in the discount rate falling from 10 per cent to 6.5 per cent (see Figure 
6.1). This was also a period of stepwise reductions in French short-term central bank rates. 
Between October 1996 and December 2000 BCEAO rates remained within a very narrow 
range (5.75-6.5 per cent), in keeping with relative stability in French interest rates, excepting 
at the end of the period.  
 
(INSERT FIGURE 6.1 ABOUT HERE) 
 
6.3 Estimating an Interest Rate Rule for the BCEAO 
 
As an initial step in our empirical inquiry, we have estimated interest rate rules for the 
BCEAO central bank where it is assumed that the BCEAO discount rate is a continuous 
variable.2 We restrict our attention to the period between January 1995 and December 2000, 
avoiding the period of the CFA franc devaluation in 1994. We examine how BCEAO interest 
                                                 
2 As in Taylor (1993), Clarida et al. (1998), Aron and Muellbauer (2000) 
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rates have responded to domestic inflation rates and to the output gap, as is common practice 
in estimates of interest rate rules for OECD countries. In addition, we consider to what extent 
the BCEAO authorities have responded to variables that may play more of a role in monetary 
policymaking in developing countries, and in particular those countries with fixed exchange 
rate regimes. These include foreign interest rates, levels of foreign assets, and changes in 
central bank claims on government. Extended interest rate rules of this sort have recently been 
considered by Aron and Muellbauer (2000) for South Africa. 
 
6.3.1 Specification and Data 
 
We begin by considering a basic monetary policy rule of the form adopted by Clarida et al. 
(1998) where the interest rate on the central bank’s short-term lending facility r* depends on 
the long-run equilibrium nominal rate r , on the difference between the expectation of the 
inflation rate for period t+n and the policymaker’s preferred rate of inflation , and on the 
difference between the expectation of output growth for period t and the preferred rate of 
output growth . This is a generalization of the simple interest rate rule that has been 
proposed by Taylor (1993).  
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Empirical estimations of equation (1) often consider both rules where the central bank reacts 
to forecasts of inflation in the next period (n=1) and rules where it reacts to the forecast for 
inflation anywhere from 6 to 24 months into the future. The central bank’s information set is 
taken to include data available in period t-1. Based on this assumption, one can then use 
instrumental variables to incorporate forward-looking expectations into the estimation. Aron 
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and Muellbauer (2000) adopt this technique to estimate an interest rate rule for South Africa. 
In the case of the West African Economic and Monetary Union, however, there is reason to 
believe that the appropriate estimation method may be more simple. When using information 
available at time t-1 to predict inflation at time t (based on monthly data), the only statistically 
significant predictor is the previous month’s inflation rate. That is, when we instrumented for 
current inflation with different lags of inflation, only the coefficient on inflation lagged one 
month was significant (and inflation lagged one quarter in the case of our quarterly dataset). 
There is no available BCEAO data on inflation expectations in UEMOA, and a recent paper 
by a member of the BCEAO staff (Tenou 2002) does not include a measure of inflation 
expectations when estimating an interest rate rule for UEMOA. As a result, in our estimate of 
the BCEAO interest rate rule we assume that when setting interest rates at time t, the BCEAO 
reacts directly to the inflation rate and the output gap as measured at time t-1. As can be seen 
from the summary statistics in Table 6.1, monthly inflation rates in UEMOA are extremely 
volatile, with a standard deviation of 7.8 percentage points.3 This volatility has potential 
implications for BCEAO policymaking; to the extent inflation is volatile and difficult to 
forecast, the BCEAO may give this variable less weight when considering interest rate 
decisions.  
 
(INSERT TABLE 6.1 ABOUT HERE) 
 
                                                 
3 Inflation rates show similar volatility in quarterly data, with a standard deviation of 6.4 
percentage points over the 1995-2000 period. There also remains nearly as much volatility in 
the series if one considers a six-month backward looking moving average for inflation rates. 
Here the standard deviation is 5.0 percentage points. A six-month moving average of this 
form was a poorer predictor of current inflation than was a one-month lag. 
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We estimated the overall output gap for the BCEAO using a Hodrick-Prescott filter and 
quarterly data for GDP.4 The recent paper by BCEAO staff that estimates an interest rate rule 
for UEMOA also uses this approach (Tenou 2002). As was true for inflation rates, the output 
gap in UEMOA is extremely volatile (see Table 6.1), and as a consequence, the BCEAO may 
give less weight to this variable in policymaking than would otherwise be the case. Given that 
the HP filter is known to have a number of shortcomings, in particularly with accuracy 
deteriorating towards the end of a series, we also experimented with alternative output gap 
measures. One option involved calculating trend GDP by using a simple 5-quarter moving 
average of real GDP growth. The output gap produced using this method turned out to be 
extremely highly correlated with our existing HP-filter measure (correlation coefficient 
>0.95).  
 
When considering whether the BCEAO alters interest rates in response to changes in 
UEMOA inflation and the output gap, we constructed each of these variables by weighting 
individual country inflation rates and output gaps by GDP. However, it is plausible that the 
decision making process within BCEAO might result in different weightings being applied in 
practice. We investigated two such possibilities. First, there is a possibility that the BCEAO 
responds only to Ivoirian economic conditions, which would be based on the interpretation 
that Côte d’Ivoire plays a predominant role in BCEAO decision making. Second, it may be 
the case that the BCEAO responds to an unweighted average of UEMOA inflation rates and 
                                                 
4 Quarterly data from Fielding et al. (2004). In addition, because there was evidence of 
seasonality of output, we regressed the output gap on a set of seasonal dummies and then used 
the residual from this regression as our final output gap measure for estimation. There was no 
strong evidence of seasonality in other variables in our dataset, nor was a set of seasonal 
dummies statistically significant in any of the regressions we performed.  
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output gaps, which would be based on the interpretation that the BCEAO statutes give 
countries equal weight in decision making, regardless of the size of their population or their 
economy. Using these two alternative measures the results did not differ very significantly 
from those reported here. 
 
In addition to considering the possibility that BCEAO interest rates react to current inflation 
and the output gap, we follow Aron and Muellbauer (2000) by examining whether interest 
rates are correlated with several other variables that may logically have an impact on interest 
rate setting in developing countries, and the BCEAO in particular. Most importantly, given 
capital mobility and the maintenance of the CFA franc’s peg to the French franc (and 
subsequently the euro), the BCEAO can be expected to react to changes in the French central 
bank rate. Failure to maintain short-term interest rates at French levels (in addition to 
compensating for a relative risk premium for holding CFA) will lead to a loss of exchange 
reserves. To the extent that the French Treasury does not unconditionally support reserve 
outflows, this will pose a constraint on BCEAO policy. As a result, in our empirical estimates 
we include the French short-term interest rate as an explanatory variable.5  
 
Given the constraint imposed by the CFA peg, the BCEAO should also logically be more 
likely to increase short-term interest rates in cases where the central bank’s foreign assets are 
low. The BCEAO statutes contain a policy rule requiring credit restrictions whenever gross 
foreign assets of the BCEAO fall below 20 per cent of sight liabilities (engagements à vue).6 
                                                 
5 Banque de France Repurchase Rate and subsequently the ECB marginal lending facility.  
6 This includes notes and coins, sight deposits of banks, financial institutions and the treasury, 
and foreign currency liabilities. 
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In our empirical estimates we include the variable a, which measures the gross foreign assets 
of the BCEAO as a share of total UEMOA GDP.  
 
Finally, given that the BCEAO has continued to provide a direct credit facility for 
governments, we also include a variable c, which measures total BCEAO claims on 
governments as a share of total UEMOA GDP. This would be justified to the extent that the 
facility is automatic (BCEAO cannot limit credit to governments unless this exceeds 20 per 
cent of annual revenues), and that there are fears that an increase in claims will have to be 
monetized at some point.7 To the extent that changes in claims provide a good proxy for the 
overall fiscal deficit, this variable may also capture the reaction to direct inflationary effects 
of expansionary fiscal policy. 
 
Results of unit root tests (reported in Table 6.2) strongly suggest that among our variables 
UEMOA inflation, claims on government, and foreign assets are stationary over the period 
considered (the output gap is stationary by construction). In contrast, there is evidence that 
both the BCEAO discount rate and French short-term central bank rate are non-stationary. 
Given the theoretical relationship between the BCEAO rate and the French short-term central 
bank rate, one might expect that if they each have a unit root, they will also be cointegrated. If 
this is the case, then it makes sense to estimate an error-correction model where BCEAO rates 
in the long-run depend exclusively on the level of French interest rates (plus a constant 
reflecting any risk premium), and our other explanatory variables in equation 3 then explain 
short-run deviations from this long-run tend. A likelihood ratio test based on the Johansen 
procedure for cointegration suggested this is indeed the case. However, the Johansen 
procedure is known to have poor properties in small samples, such as we have here. Tests for 
                                                 
7 A similar assumption is made in Fielding (2002) chapter 3. 
 6-8
cointegration based on the method proposed by Engle and Granger (1987) suggested that the 
null of no-cointegration of French rates and BCEAO rates could not be rejected.  
 
(INSERT TABLE 6.2 ABOUT HERE) 
 
Based on the above tests results, which do not demonstrate unambiguously that BCEAO and 
French interest rates are cointegrated, we have nonetheless chosen to estimate the error 
correction model reported in equations (2) and (3), below. This method produced similar 
results to those obtained when assuming that all variables are stationary.  
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6.3.1 Estimates Using Quarterly Data  
 
Regressions 1 and 2 in Table 6.3 report estimates of equations (2) and (3) using quarterly data 
for the period 1995-2001. We begin with a simple rule that considers the relationship between 
BCEAO interest rates, inflation, the output gap, and French interest rates (equation 2). In this 
regression the coefficient on French interest rates is highly significant, and given the 
confidence interval for this coefficient, this result is also consistent with the proposition that 
in the long-run, a change in French interest rates will have to be matched by a one-for-one 
change in BCEAO interest rates. In the short-run equation the coefficient on lagged inflation 
is of the expected sign and quite large, but it is not statistically significant. The coefficient on 
the output gap is both large and statistically significant.  
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 We next estimate an extended rule where the BCEAO interest rate also responds to changes in 
the level of foreign assets held by the BCEAO and to changes in central bank claims on the 
government (equation 3). In this specification in the short-run equation, the coefficient on 
UEMOA inflation is not significant either, but the coefficient on the output gap remains of 
similar magnitude and is significant at the 10 per cent level. The coefficients on the foreign 
assets variable and the government claims variable have the expected sign, but they are not 
statistically significant.  
 
(INSERT TABLE 6.3 ABOUT HERE) 
 
Given the results of these regressions using quarterly data, the horizon most frequently used 
to estimate interest rate rules, it can be suggested that the BCEAO responds strongly to 
changes in French interest rates, but there is also an indication that in the short-run the 
BCEAO reacts systematically to lagged inflation and the output gap.  
 
6.3.3 Estimates Using Monthly Data 
 
While the majority of empirical studies of interest rate rules use quarterly data, several 
authors have observed that it may make more sense to use monthly data for these estimates, 
because this is the frequency with which central bank governing boards generally meet to 
consider interest rate changes.8 Among the variables used in our estimations of equations 2 
and 3, the output gap is only available on a quarterly basis, but data for all other variables is 
available monthly. Models 3 and 4 from Table 6.3 report estimates of an interest rate rule for 
                                                 
8 This point has been made by Clarida et al. (1998) as well as Chevapatrakul et al. (2001).  
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the BCEAO using monthly data.9 In these regressions the output gap has been constructed 
using a simple interpolation where the output gap in each month is estimated to be equal to 
the measured output gap for that quarter.  
 
In regression 3 (based on equation 2) there is again evidence that in the long-run the BCEAO 
responds one for one to changes in French short-term interest rates. In addition, there is now 
more unambiguous evidence that BCEAO responds to increases in inflation with higher 
interest rates. A one standard deviation increase in UEMOA inflation (+.078) is estimated to 
result in a short-run increase of 0.06 in the BCEAO’s discount rate. The coefficient on the 
output gap in regression 3 is also statistically significant, suggesting that a one standard 
deviation increase in the output gap (0.054) would be associated with a short-run increase in 
BCEAO rates of 0.03 percentage points. The results for regression 4 (based on equation 3) 
with regard to inflation and the output gap are quite similar. Once again, there is no evidence 
that the BCEAO responds to changes in its level of foreign assets or to changes in claims on 
government.  
 
In sum, our estimates using monthly data suggest that while changes in French interest rates 
remain the primary factor to which the BCEAO responds when it sets its discount rate, since 
1995 the BCEAO has also reacted to UEMOA inflation and the UEMOA output gap.  
 
6.4 Estimating Probabilities of Interest Rate Changes 
                                                 
9 Given the significance of a number of variables in our regressions using quarterly data, it 
may make sense to include three lags of our dependent variable in our monthly regressions. 
We began with this specification but excluded the second and third lags after we found that 
they were never statistically significant.  
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 While standard interest rate rules are used to estimate how the level of interest rates responds 
to changes in macroeconomic variables such as inflation and output, and they implicitly 
assume that interest rates can be modified by any amount, in practice central banks face 
choices of whether to respond to changing economic conditions with a discrete change in 
interest rates, generally of at least 25 basis points. As a consequence, rather than using 
macroeconomic variables to predict the level of interest rates, it may also be useful to use 
these same variables to predict the direction of change of the central bank’s discount rate (cut, 
no change, or increase). In this section we follow Chevapatrakul et al. (2001) by using a 
multinomial logit model to estimate the probability that the BCEAO will cut interest rates, 
increase rates, or hold them constant in any given month. The multinomial logit model allows 
us to take account of the fact that central banks are forced to choose between no change in the 
interest rate, a discrete increase, or a discrete decrease.10 We view this method as 
complementary to the method used for estimating the interest rate rules in Section 6.3, as 
using both methods will help us to identify the extent to which assumptions about BCEAO 
behaviour are driven by specific assumptions about whether the BCEAO discount rate is a 
continuous variable.  
 
Over the period we consider, while the level of the BCEAO’s discount rate has varied 
significantly, changes in the level have tended to occur in large discrete jumps. Over the 73 
months in our sample the BCEAO changed rates on 10 occasions, decreasing rates eight 
times, and increasing rates in two instances. Seven out of these ten modifications involved 
changes of at least 50 basis points. This distribution of outcomes suggests that while it may be 
                                                 
10 For reasons of tractability we ignore the fact that the BCEAO has made discrete changes of 
differing magnitudes in recent years. 
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possible to predict decreases in the discount rate with some confidence, it may be quite 
difficult to predict rate increases very accurately. Given this distribution, one might prefer to 
group together cases of interest rate increases with cases where the rate was held steady and 
then use a standard logit or probit model to estimate the likelihood of a rate decrease. We also 
considered this possibility and found that the results were very similar to those obtained with 
the multinomial logit procedure. As a consequence, we have chosen to report the multinomial 
logit estimates in Table 6.4. 
 
(INSERT TABLE 6.4 ABOUT HERE) 
 
Table 6.4 reports the results of our multinomial logit estimates of the following three 
outcomes where is a vector of variables that are likely to be correlated with interest rate 
changes.  
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For the vector , we use the same set of explanatory variables used to estimate equations (2) 
and (3), with one exception. Instead of using the level of French short-term interest rates, we 
use the difference between the BCEAO’s discount rate and the French/ECB short-term rate as 
an explanatory variable . While the level of the French rate is a likely predictor 
of the level of BCEAO rate, the probability that BCEAO rates will be changed in any given 
month is more likely to be a function of the difference between the BCEAO rate and the 
French rate.  
tX
)( 11
FR
t
BCEAO
t rr −− −
 6-13
 Table 6.4 reports the results of our multinomial logit estimates. In the reduced model, the 
coefficient on the difference between the BCEAO rate and the French rate has the expected 
sign both for predicting cuts in the BCEAO rate and for predicting increases, and it is 
statistically significant in the former case. In addition, the level of UEMOA inflation has a 
statistically significant effect on the probability of a rate cut: higher inflation makes a cut less 
probable. Contrary to intuition, the coefficient on the output gap is actually positive and 
significant, suggesting that when GDP is above trend the BCEAO is more likely to cut 
interest rates.  
 
The ‘extended model’ reported in Table 6.4 adds claims on government and the level of 
foreign assets to the central bank’s information set. In this extended model the coefficients on 
UEMOA inflation and on the output gap remain of similar magnitude as in the reduced 
model. In addition, the levels of BCEAO foreign assets and of its claims on government are 
significant predictors of a cut in the BCEAO’s discount rate. A likelihood ratio test shows that 
these coefficients are jointly significant. As would be expected, when foreign assets are high 
and claims on government are low, the BCEAO is more likely to cut rates.  
 
A look at the substantive magnitude of the effects from our multinomial logit estimates 
provides a mixed picture. Changes in French interest rates have large effects on our estimated 
probabilities of interest rate changes, and changes in other explanatory variables may also 
have sizeable effects, but only when they are quite far from their mean values. For each of our 
explanatory variables, Table 6.5 reports the predicted probability of a cut in BCEAO interest 
rates when the variable in question is set at one, two and three standard deviations away from 
its mean. Other variables remain set at their mean values (when all variables are set at their 
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means the estimated probability of an interest rate cut is 0.001). The value for each of the 
variables listed is shifted in the direction, which, according to the extended model in Table 
6.4, would be associated with an increased probability of a cut in the BCEAO discount rate. 
From the Table it is clear that an increase in the gap between French and BCEAO interest 
rates by one standard deviation or more has a very large effect on the estimated probability of 
an interest rate cut. In contrast, the level of UEMOA inflation or the level of foreign assets 
only has a sizeable impact on the estimated probability of a rate cut when these variables are 
at least two standard deviations away from their mean. In the sample we consider, this would 
apply to only 2 per cent of the observations for foreign assets and 5 per cent of the 
observations for inflation. Finally, even very large changes in levels of claims on government 
have no effect on the estimated probability of a rate cut.  
 
(INSERT TABLE 6.5 ABOUT HERE) 
 
As a final look at the substantive predictions of our multinomial logit estimates, Figure 6.2 
charts the estimated probabilities of a rate cut for each date in our sample (in the shaded 
columns), and it also indicates the dates on which the BCEAO actually chose to cut interest 
rates (in the unshaded columns). As can be seen, there is a reasonably close correspondence 
between a high predicted probability of a cut, and an actual BCEAO decision to cut rates. 
However, a further look shows that the accuracy of the model is driven above all by the 
estimated effect of a change in the interest rate differential between UEMOA and France. 
Figure 6.3 reports the estimated probabilities from the extended model after we removed the 
interest rate differential variable from the regression. As can now be seen, there continues to 
be a correlation between a predicted change in rates and an actual change in rates, but the 
predicted probability of a change in rates in this model is never greater than 0.5.  
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 (INSERT FIGURE 6.2 ABOUT HERE) 
(INSERT FIGURE 6.3 ABOUT HERE) 
 
6.5 Robustness of the Interest Rate Results 
 
Before drawing firm conclusions based on our estimates, it is worth considering to what 
extent these results may be influenced by serial correlation of the errors, by outliers, and by 
the model specification we adopted. We conclude that our results are robust after considering 
each of these potential problems.  
 
Standard tests for serial correlation of errors provided mixed conclusions about our Table 6.3 
estimates. Based on a Durbin h test, the null of no first-order serial correlation could not be 
rejected for either the estimates using quarterly data or those using monthly data. On the other 
hand, results of a Breusch-Godfrey test, which can be used to test for both first-order and 
higher-order autocorrelation, suggested that there is first order autocorrelation in both our 
quarterly and our monthly estimates, and there is also higher order autocorrelation in the 
quarterly estimates. These results for the quarterly data should probably be qualified by the 
fact that the sample size is quite small. We examined whether inclusion of additional lags of 
our explanatory variables could successfully address any potential serial correlation. 
However, after inclusion of additional lags, the coefficients on these lag terms were not 
statistically significant, and tests continued to suggest that both first-order and higher-order 
autocorrelation might be present. As a consequence, in our Table 6.3 estimates we have 
reported the standard errors proposed by Newey and West (1987), which are consistent in the 
presence of both first order and higher order autocorrelation.  
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 We also considered to what extent our empirical results are influenced by the presence of 
outliers. For the estimates in Table 6.3 we identified outliers using Cook’s distance and then 
re-estimated the regressions after excluding those observations where this value was greater 
than 4/(n-k-1). After exclusion of several outliers the results of all four regressions remained 
similar. For our multinomial logit estimates we identified outliers using the Delta-Beta 
influence statistic developed by Pregibon (1981). After exclusion of two outliers (January 
1995 and June 1996) the estimates for predicting a cut in interest rates remained virtually 
unchanged. In contrast, in both the reduced and the extended model the estimates for an 
increase in BCEAO rates altered substantially. The coefficients on lagged inflation, the 
lagged output gap, and claims on government were each statistically significant with the 
expected sign.  
 
In addition to examining the effect of serial correlation and outliers on our results, it is also 
worth considering to what extent our conclusions are dependent on the particular specification 
adopted in our OLS and multinomial logit estimates. As a first possibility, we considered to 
what extent our results depend on the restrictive assumption that BCEAO does not use a 
forecast for inflation and the output gap when setting policy. When we re-estimated our 
regressions while including a forecast of inflation and output (based on instruments available 
at time t-1), the results were quite close to those reported here.  
 
6.6 Conclusion 
 
Our empirical results provide a nuanced picture regarding monetary policy in the West 
African Economic and Monetary Union. Short-term central bank rates in France (now the 
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Eurozone) have continued to be the most important influence on both the level of the 
BCEAO’s discount rate and on decisions to alter the BCEAO discount rate. This is a logical 
implication of the CFA franc’s peg to the French franc (and now the euro). While our 
estimates suggest that in the long-run the BCEAO has to match changes in the Bank of France 
(now ECB) lending rate on a one for one basis, it nonetheless appears to retain flexibility in 
the short-run to use interest rates to react to changes in UEMOA economic conditions. We 
have provided evidence that the BCEAO takes into account inflation rates, the output gap, 
central bank claims on government, and its foreign exchange position when making interest 
rate decisions. It should be noted, though, that the substantive magnitude of these effects 
remains relatively small. 
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Table 6.1 
Summary statistics 
 Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
BCEAO discount 6.72 1.09 5.75 10.0 
French/ECB short 
term interest rate 
3.64 0.80 2.50 5.00 
UEMOA inflation 0.028 0.078 -0.131 0.206 
Output gap 0.006 0.052 -0.157 0.100 
Foreign 
assets/GDP 
0.326 0.045 0.215 0.435 
Claims on 
govt/GDP 
0.309 0.034 0.261 0.422 
 
These figures are based on monthly data 1995-2000. Summary figures for the 
quarterly dataset used in the paper are similar. 
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Table 6.2 
Unit root tests of regression variables 
 
 Quarterly 
(no trend) 
Quarterly
(trend) 
Monthly  
(no trend) 
Monthly  
(trend) 
BCEAO discount -3.82 
p<0.01 
-0.89 
p=0.96 
-3.82 
p<0.01 
-1.73 
p=0.74 
French rate -1.49 
p=0.53 
-0.05 
p=0.99 
-1.30 
p=0.63 
0.43 
p=0.99 
UEMOA inflation -4.06 
p<0.01 
-4.57 
p<0.01 
-5.69 
p<0.01 
-5.85 
p<0.01 
Claims on 
government/GDP 
-5.40 
p<0.01 
-5.72 
p<0.01 
-4.63 
p<0.01 
-5.22 
p<0.01 
Foreign Assets/GDP -3.86 
p<0.01 
-3.57 
p=0.03 
-3.53 
p<0.01 
-4.20 
p<0.01 
 
Results are based on Phillips-Perron tests conducted with and without a trend. 
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Table 6.3 
Estimating an interest rate rule for BCEAO 
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Long-run equation     
French ratet 1.14 
(0.29) 
1.14 
(0.29) 
1.14 
(0.19) 
1.14 
(0.19) 
Constant 2.59 
(0.89) 
2.59 
(0.89) 
2.57 
(0.61) 
2.57 
(0.61) 
Short-run equation     
Δ French rate 0.39 
(0.16) 
0.41 
(0.19) 
0.36 
(0.18) 
0.36 
(0.19) 
UEMOA inflation (t-1) 0.79 
(0.96) 
-0.07 
(1.27) 
0.76 
(0.30) 
0.81 
(0.36) 
Output gap (t-1) 1.40 
(0.68) 
1.76 
(1.02) 
0.60 
(0.34) 
0.74 
(0.47) 
Claims on government/GDP  1.74 
(2.80) 
 0.69 
(1.25) 
Foreign assets/GDP  -2.85 
(2.45) 
 -0.15 
(0.63) 
Error-correction term -0.28 
(0.09) 
-0.35 
(0.07) 
-0.14 
(0.04) 
-0.14 
(0.05) 
Constant -.013 
(0.04) 
0.31 
(1.01) 
-0.06 
(0.02) 
-0.23 
(0.28) 
N= 25 25 73 73 
Frequency quarterly quarterly monthly monthly 
   
Estimation by OLS with Newey-West standard errors (in parentheses). 
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Table 6.4 
Estimating probability of a change in BCEAO interest rates  
multinomial logit estimates 
 Reduced model Extended model 
 Cut Increase Cut Increase 
)( 11
FR
t
BCEAO
t rr −− −   5.04 
(1.88) 
-2.50 
(1.43) 
13.0 
(3.7) 
-2.70 
(1.17) 
UEMOA inflation (t-1) -13.9 
(6.1) 
8.1 
(12.4) 
-31.1 
(13.7) 
8.9 
(10.2) 
Output gap (t-1) 35.2 
(17.5) 
5.10 
(3.76) 
53.0 
(18.3) 
7.88 
(8.63) 
Claims on government/GDP   -39.2 
(18.6) 
15.2 
(37.6) 
Foreign assets/GDP   75.7 
(31.6) 
-4.17 
(19.3) 
Constant -19.5 
(7.0) 
2.91 
(3.01) 
-59.2 
(18.3) 
1.135 
(0.608) 
N= 73 73 
Pr>Chi2 – H0: constant only p<0.01 p<0.01 
Pr>Chi2 – H0: reduced model  p=0.064 
 
Estimation by multinomial logit with heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors (in 
parentheses). 
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Table 6.5 
Predicted probability of an interest rate cut 
  )0Pr( 1 <− −tt rr  
Variable variable change 1 Std. Dev. 2 Std. Dev. 3 Std. Dev. 
Difference (t-1) above mean 0.78 0.99 0.99 
UEMOA infl. (t-1) below mean 0.01 0.13 0.62 
Output gap (t-1) above mean 0.02 0.24 0.83 
Claims on govt/GDP below mean <0.01 0.02 0.06 
Foreign assets/GDP above mean 0.03 0.51 0.93 
 
Based on extended model reported in Table 6.3. Other variables set at their means. Predicted 
probability when all variables are set at their means is 0.001. 
 
 6-24
Figure 6.1 
BCEAO interest rates and French interest rates, 1995-2000 
period
 BCEAO discount rate France CB refinancing rate
60 132
2.5
10
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Figure 6.2 
Estimated probability of a rate cut – using gap with French rates 
(actual cut indicated by unshaded column) 
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Figure 6.3 
Estimated probability of a rate cut – domestic variables only 
(actual cut indicated by unshaded column) 
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